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ONE NATION, UNDER SECURITIES FRAUD? THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NOTCHES A WIN FOR FEDERALISM IN IN RE LORD
ABBETT MUTUAL FUNDS 1EE LITIGATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the financial crises, courts have experienced an increase in securities fraud litigation as shareholders attempt to hold financial institutions accountable.' Given the recent 2008 stock market and
credit crises, federal courts are currently experiencing a remarkably high
2
volume of particularly complex securities fraud litigation. Indeed, in
their zeal for redress, many plaintiffs are bringing more than one claim
against defendants, pleading multiple theories of recovery-often under
3
both state and federal law.
1. See Melissa Klein Aguilar, Reports Detail 2009 Securities Class-Action Filings
Trends, COMPLIANCE WEEK, Jan. 6, 2010, https://www.complianceweek.com/blog/
aguilar/2010/01/06/reports-detail-2009-securities-class-action-filings-trends/

(quoting John Gould, Senior Vice President of Cornerstone Research, as stating

that "[h] istorically, periods of high market volatility coincide with a greater level of
securities class-action filings").
2. See Sarah S. Gold & Richard L. Spinogatti, Recent Circuit Decisions Illustrate
SLUSA's Limitations, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 8, 2009, at 3 (concluding that "the volume of
securities litigation [will] grow[ ] in response to the continuing tumult in our capital markets"); Mark Perry & Indraneel Sur, SLUSA Precludes 'Actions,'Not Claims, 7
MEALEY's EMERGING SEC. LITIG. 9-10 (2009) (explaining that financial system "tur-

bulence" has "already generated dozens of private class actions alleging securities
fraud," and "no doubt will continue to do so for years to come"); see also CORNER2
STONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLAss ACTION FILINGS 2008: A YEAR IN REVIEW
2
(2009), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse-research/ 008YIR/20090106_YIRO8 FullReport.pdf (concluding that class action filings in 2008
were at highest level since 2004). "This level of litigation activity against firms in a
specific sector [financial services] is unprecedented since the passage of the 1995
Reform Act." Id. But see CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLAss ACTION FILINGS
2009: A YEAR IN REVIEw 2 (2010), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/clear2 9
00 _YIR.pdf (coninghouse-research/2009_YIR/CornerstoneResearchFilings
Nevertheless,
numbers).
cluding that new filings declined in 2009 from 2008
commentators explain that there has been an increase in the renewal of old filings
by plaintiffs. See Aguilar, supra note 1 (reasoning that increase in filing of older
claims in 2009 was caused by plaintiffs "trying to fill the litigation pipeline by bringing older lawsuits that weren't attractive enough to file while the firms were busy
pursuing financial sector claims" (quoting Joseph Grundfest, SECURITIES CLASs AcTION FILINGS 2009, supra)).

3. See, e.g., In re Lord Abbett Mut. Fund Fee Litig., 553 F.3d 248, 249 (3d Cir.
2009) (alleging four federal law claims and four state law claims); Proctor v. Vishay
Intertech., Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 2009) (alleging state law breach
of fiduciary duty, state fraud claims, and "quasi appraisal" rights claim under Delaware law); Behlen v. Merrill Lynch, 311 F.3d 1087, 1089 (11th Cir. 2002) (alleging
class action securities fraud claim and additional class-wide claims); In re Blackrock
Mut. Funds Fee Litig., No. 04 Civ. 164, 2006 WL 4683167, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 29,
2006) (alleging both federal law violations and state law claims); In re Dreyfus Mut.
Funds Fee Litig., 428 F. Supp. 2d 342, 345-46 (W.D. Pa. 2005) (same); cf PHILIP E.

(1059)
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In these circumstances, plaintiffs are confronted with the potentially
fatal preemption problem that arises from language in federal legislation
known as the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA). 4 This
language preempts, and requires a court to dismiss with prejudice, a plaintiffs "action" brought under state law.5 Specifically, where a plaintiffs
complaint contains claims that SLUSA preempts and others that SLUSA
does not, SLUSA instructs courts that the plaintiffs "action" is preempted.6 Ambiguity in the word "action," however, creates a dilemma for
district courts (and a headache for plaintiffs): should courts dismiss only
the preempted claims, or should courts dismiss the entire complaint?7
While the circuit courts of appeals have recognized this problem, they remain divided as whether to dismiss the entire complaint or retain those
claims that SLUSA does not preempt. 8 In addition to the crucial consequences this decision has on plaintiffs' securities fraud claims, determining how to interpret SLUSA's language is also significant because it
implicates broader questions of statutory interpretation and the preservation of federalism. 9
In two recent decisions, the Third Circuit addressed the issue of
whether, when a plaintiff pleads a mixed-claim complaint, SLUSA's directive that a court cannot maintain a plaintiffs "action" requires dismissal of
the entire complaint or only the preempted claims. 10 In Rowinski v. SaloSTANO

ET AL., SIGNIFICANT TRENDS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION

33 (2009),

available at http://www.sutherland.com/files/Publication/7aal5b5-af97-4al4-b1
9

8e- 8030 7 c4 50e/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/64078a4d-ef49-4c9f-9d5c6
OabOO4 9

bcb5 /ALICSignificantTrendsInFinancialServicesLitigation.pdf (stating
that plaintiffs' bar continues to assert national class actions, now involving federal
as well as state law claims).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (1) (2006).
5. See id. ("No covered class action based upon the statutory or common law

of any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any State or Federal court
by any private party alleging . . . .").

6. For a discussion of the ambiguity of the term "action," see infra note 89 and
accompanying text.
7. See Proctor,584 F.3d at 1226 ("SLUSA unquestionably requires the dismissal

of the precluded claim (2), but does it require the dismissal of the other, nonprecluded claims as well?").
8. For a discussion of the split in lower courts on the issue of mixed-complaint
preemption, see infra notes 47-71 and accompanying text.
9. See Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25, 37 (2d
Cir. 2005) (declining to read SLUSA to preempt "historic police powers of the
states" without clear intent from Congress), rev'd on other grounds by Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006); see also Richard W.
Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: FederalPreemption of State Securities Fraud Causes
of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 89 (1998) (arguing that sweeping preemption
undermines "representative democracy and civic republicanism"); Larry E. Ribstein, Dabit, Preemption, and Choice of Law, 2006 CATO Sup. CT. REV. 141, 141 (2006)
(introducing policy issues of abusive litigation, control of securities fraud, and federalism under SLUSA as conflicting).
10. For a discussion of Third Circuit jurisprudence on the mixed-complaint
issue, see infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
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mon Smith Barney," the court stated, in dicta, that the plain language of
SLUSA requires the dismissal of the entire complaint-both preempted
and non-preempted claims.1 2 Yet, four years later, when squarely
presented with the issue in In re Lord Abbett Mutual Funds Fee Litigation,

3

the court expressly rejected Rowinski's dicta and held that SLUSA's plain
language, legislative history, and purpose supports a court's ability to dismiss only preempted claims, and retain non-preempted claims for adjudication on the merits. 14 The court seemed to limit this holding, however,
15
to non-preempted federal law claims.
This Casebrief examines Third Circuit jurisprudence regarding
SLUSA preemption of mixed-claim complaints and serves as a guide to
practitioners bringing or defending motions for dismissal on SLUSA preemption grounds. 16 Part II provides a brief history of securities fraud regulation under federal law. 1 7 Part III explains how various circuit and
district courts have dealt with the important practical problem of mixedcomplaint dismissal.1 8 Part IV details the Third Circuit's decision in Lord
Abbett.19 Part V provides insight into the Third Circuit's reasoning and
develops arguments that practitioners on both sides may use to apply Lord
Abbett in future cases. 20 Finally, Part VI argues that the Third Circuit's
treatment of mixed-claim securities fraud complaints will allow more
plaintiffs the opportunity to find judicial redress for losses incurred as a
21
result of the recent financial turbulence.

11. 398 F.3d 295 (3d Cir. 2005).
12. See id. at 305 (stating in dicta that entire complaint is preempted and
should be dismissed).
13. 553 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2009).
14. See id. at 249 (concluding that SLUSA does not require dismissal of entire
complaint). For a complete discussion of the Third Circuit's holding and reasoning in Lord Abbett, see infra notes 77-112 and accompanying text.
15. See Lord Abbett, 553 F.3d at 256 ("We hold simply that any valid federal
claims pled in the same action-claims that, if brought independently, would
clearly fall outside of SLUSA's pre-emptive scope-need not also be dismissed.").
16. For a discussion of recommendations and guidance for practitioners
bringing or defending motions to dismiss on SLUSA preemption grounds, see infra notes 113-151 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the history of securities litigation, see infra notes 22-46
and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the circuit split on mixed-complaint preemption, see
infra notes 47-71 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the Lord Abbett court's holding and rationale, see infra
notes 72-112 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of practitioners' use of Lord Abbett, see infra notes 113-151
and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the possible impact of Lord Abbett, see infra notes 152158 and accompanying text.
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BRIEF HISTORY OF SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION

Securities fraud lawsuits have long been a part of American jurisprudence. 22 The requirements and the forums in which litigants seek redress
for these claims, however, have varied greatly over time. 2 3 From its origins
in common law fraud, to the birth of federal remedies under the New
Deal, to two major reforms in the 1990s, the history of securities fraud is
long and contentious. 24
A.

The Birth of Securities Fraud Claims: Common Law to the New Deal

Securities fraud litigation developed as a fraud claim under state common law and, in keeping with this origin, required a plaintiff to prove the
traditional elements of fraud. 2 5 Under this common law framework, however, the unique factual circumstances of securities fraud made it difficult
for plaintiffs to show the elements of reliance and intent.2 6 As a result,
plaintiffs' claims often fell on deaf ears.2 7
22. Cf Louis Loss & EDWARD M. CowETT, BLUE SKY LAW 5-7 (1958) (explaining that Kansas enacted first state securities law in 1911); Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of
Contract and the Securities Laws: Opting Out of Securities Regulation by PrivateAgreement,
56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 519, 533-34 (1999) (stating that securities regulation in
general can be found as far back as thirteenth-century England, and that Kansas
was first state to enact state securities regulations).
23. SeeJeffrey T. Cook, Recrafting theJurisdictionalFrameworkfor Private Rights of
Action Under the FederalSecurities Laws, 55 Am. U. L. REv. 621, 623 (2006) (concluding, after detailing historical backdrop, that evolution of securities fraud litigation
"is far from a model of clarity or consistency").
24. For a discussion of the history of securities fraud and the contemporaneous disagreements about how to remedy its initial problems, see infra notes 25-46
and accompanying text.

25. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF
BUSINEsS ORGANIZATION 615 (3d ed. 2009) (identifying common law fraud ele-

ments as: (1) defendant making false statement; (2) of material fact; (3) with intent to deceive; (4) plaintiff reasonably relied on that statement; and (5) causing
injury to plaintiff).
26. See id. (explaining plaintiffs' difficulty in meeting reasonable reliance element); see also Harry Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227,
231-42 (1933) (claiming very few investors ever brought suit because they knew of
inadequacy of common law); Comment, The Prospectsfor Rule X-10B-5: An Emerging
Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1123-25 (1950) (noting "notorious
inadequacy" of common law remedies in regard to both misrepresentation and
non-disclosure).
27. See ALLEN, supra note 25, at 616 (stating that majority rule was that directors only owed duty to corporation and did not have duty of disclosure to "those
with whom [they] traded shares"). The Supreme Court, however, also applied an
"intermediate" rule: where special facts existed, directors had a "disclose or refrain" duty. See id. (citing Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909)) (explaining attempt of Supreme Court to alleviate problems of common law fraud claims); see
also The Prospects for Rule X-10B-5, supra note 26, at 1125-26 (noting that court
waived fiduciary duty rule when "crucial facts were concealed," but explaining that
plaintiffs still rarely brought suit because it was not "financially feasible" to assemble proof of this concealment).
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After the financial depression in 1929, the need for increased federal
regulation of securities became pervasive, and Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.28 Pursuant
to its congressionally granted rulemaking authority under Section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
promulgated Rule 10b-5, which made it unlawful to fraudulently purchase
or sell securities. 29 Once courts recognized a private right of action under
Rule 10b-5, plaintiffs abandoned the often-inadequate common law and
0
state law fraud claims in favor of private suits under federal law.s
28. See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2006)); Cook,
supra note 23, at 627 (stating that new legislation was needed to "protect and restore investor confidence in the wake of the stock market crash of 1929"); see also S.
REP. No. 73-792, at 1-2 (1934) (justifying Exchange Act of 1934 as vehicle "to provide for the regulation of securities exchanges and of over-the-counter markets
operating in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails," and "to
prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such exchanges and markets"); S. REP.
No. 73-47, at 1 (1933) (stating in regards to 1933 Act, that its aim was to prevent
sales of "unsound, fraudulent, and worthless securities").
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006) ("It shall be unlawful ... to use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . , any manipulative or

deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe."). Rule lOb-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,

(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009). This rule was written and adopted in haste and yet is
central to all modern securities fraud claims. See ALLEN, supra note 25, at 630 (recounting rapid drafting and adoption of Rule lOb-5, "the most important rule
promulgated by the SEC under §10(b)").
30. See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa.
1946) (inferring private right of action under Rule 1Ob-5); see also Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (concluding that private cause of action
under Rule lOb-5 has long been established). But seejoseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying PrivateRights of Action Under the FederalSecurities Law: The Commission's Authority,
107 HARv. L. REv. 961, 988-989 (1994) (arguing that Kardon, if decided today in
line with Supreme Court precedent, would not have implied private right of action
under Rule lOb-5). Several Supreme Court cases induced plaintiffs' shift to federal
law securities fraud. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 15354 (1972) (allowing litigants to overcome main hurdle in common law fraud, reliance, by allowing presumption of reliance in cases where there is duty to disclose
material information, and that duty has been breached); see also Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1983) (stating that federal securities laws were enacted "to rectify perceived deficiencies in the available commonlaw protections by establishing higher standards of conduct in the securities industry"). Courts now presume reliance in the more troublesome problem of proving
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Nevertheless, the construction of a private right of action also created
problems.3 1 Under this private right, plaintiffs enjoyed relaxed pleading
requirements and federal case law allowed courts to presume the element
of reliance in the prima facie case; combined, these standards served to
minimize plaintiffs' susceptibility to motions to dismiss. 3 2 As plaintiffs'
ability to overcome dismissal increased, corporations became incentivized
to settle rather than to fight meridess claims and bear the expense of litigation.3 3 In addition, these meritless claims, termed "strike suits," 34 also
"'deterred qualified individuals from serving on boards of directors' due
to fear of being dragged into litigation."3 5 Thus, though federal legislation eased the burden on plaintiffs seeking redress for securities fraud
claims, it also seemed to tip the scales too far in favor of plaintiffs' rights.
Congress took notice.3 6

when an insider has omitted to disclose information. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224, 246-47 (1988) (establishing presumption of reliance in omissions

cases utilizing fraud-on-the-market theory).
31. See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The UnjustifiedJudicialCreation of Class Certification Merits Trials in Securities Fraud, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
323, 344 (2010) (stating that in 1990s "Congress perceived a threat to the stability
of the American financial markets from these Rule lob-5 actions").
32. See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 246-47 (establishing presumption of reliance in
omissions cases utilizing fraud-on-the-market theory).
33. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (stating reasoning
for enacting PSLRA), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730; S. REP. No. 104-98, at
4 ("These [securities fraud] suits, which unnecessarily increase the cost of raising
capital and chill corporate disclosure, are often based on nothing more than a
company's announcement of bad news, not evidence of fraud."), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683; see also In re Lord Abbett Mut. Fund Fee Litig., 553 F.3d 248,
250 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining Congress's motive for enacting PSLRA was to prevent abusive class actions, known as "strike suits," which are brought only with
hope that due to litigation expense, defendants will settle rather than litigate and
reach merits of claim); In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 973 (9th
Cir. 1999) ("Congress enacted the PSLRA to deter opportunistic private plaintiffs
from filing abusive securities fraud claims.").
34. See BLACK's LAw DIcrIONARY 1475 (8th ed. 2004) (defining strike suit as
"[a] suit (esp. a derivative action), often based on no valid claim, brought either
for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated settlement"); see
also Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334, 1341 (11th
Cir. 2002) (stating that strike suits are "brought for the purpose of forcing securities defendants into large settlements in order to avoid costly discovery").
35. See Perry & Sur, supra note 2, at 2 (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006)) (providing history of 1Ob-5); see also
Kurt Eichenwald, Millionsfor Us, Penniesfor You, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1993, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/1 9 9 3/12/19/business/millions-for-us-pennies-foryou.html?pagewanted=1?pagewanted=1 (explaining that attorneys have incentive
to bring suit to settle because of fees in millions of dollars, while plaintiffs often
receive very little).
36. For a discussion of Congress's response to the problems of the private
right of action under Rule lOb-5, see infra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
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Growing Pains: Securities Law Grows Up with the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act and the Securities Litigation
Unirnmn Standards Act

In an effort to combat the detrimental effects of strike suits, Congress
7
enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).3
The PSLRA developed hurdles to deter strike suits, such as heightened
pleading requirements and an automatic stay of discovery once a defendant filed a motion to dismiss. 38 These requirements were intended to
make it very difficult for plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss in federal
court.3 9
Nonetheless, plaintiffs found that they could avoid the PSLRA by filing securities fraud suits in state courts raising state law claims, because
such claims were not bound by PSLRA requirements. 40 To combat this
37. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737, 743 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006)). "[P]rivate securities litigation
system is too important to the integrity of American capital markets to allow this
system to be undermined by those who seek to line their own pockets by bringing
abusive and meritless suits." H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31-32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.),
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.

38. See

MICHAEL

A.

PERINO, SECURITIEs LITIGATION AFTER THE REFORM

Acr

1023 (2006) ("Congress's predominant approach to address the problems that it
identified in securities litigation practices was to craft a set of procedural hurdles
designed to make it more difficult to bring and maintain class action litigation in
federal court."). The heightened pleading standards required the plaintiff to both
"state with particularity all facts which that belief is formed," and to "state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with
the requisite state of mind." See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (1) (B) (2006) (detailing
pleading standards under PSLRA). The mandatory discovery stay was a direct attempt at curbing the high costs associated with strike suits because as soon as the
defendant filed a motion to dismiss, no discovery could occur until the court ruled
on the motion. See id. § 78u-4(b) (3) (B) (mandating discovery stay). Other limitations provided under the PSLRA were proportional liability and contribution,
damages limitations, sanctions, safe-harbors for forward-looking statements, and
class action settlement procedures. See id. § 78u-4 (stating limitations on securities
fraud suits).
39. See PERINO, supra note 38, at 3011 ("Among the more controversial provi-

sions of the PSLRA was a pleading requirement intended to make it harder for

unwarranted allegations of fraud to survive a motion to dismiss."). As to the discovery stay, this also had detrimental effects on the plaintiffs ability to survive a
motion to dismiss. See id. at 4015 ("The combination of the discovery stay and the
Act's higher pleading standard may present a significant challenge for plaintiffs,
particularly in cases where facts supporting a federal securities law claim are solely
within the defendants' control." (citing ElliotJ. Weiss & Janet E. Moser, Enter Yossarian:How to Result the ProceduralCatch-22 that the PrivateSecurities Litigation Reform
Act Creates, 76 WASH. U.L.Q. 457, 460-61 (1998))); see also Painter, supra note 9, at
35 (concluding that PSLRA deterred some frivolous suits, but "also makes litigation on behalf of defrauded investors more difficult").
40. See H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 14-15 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (quoting Joseph
A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year's Experience (Stanford Law Sch., Working Paper No. 97-1, 1997), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/research/studies/19970227firstyr-firstyr.html) (stating ways that
litigants circumvented requirements of PSLRA). Plaintiffs began filing claims in
state court, a venue that before the PSLRA most plaintiffs disregarded when con-
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"federal flight," Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) 4 1 just three years later, which gave federal courts exclusive jurisdiction, with stated exceptions, for securities fraud class
actions. 4 2 SLUSA provides that no court may maintain a "covered class
action" claiming a violation of state law if the complaint alleges fraudulent
templating a securities fraud action. See PERINO, supra note 38, at 11,016 (stating
that after PSLRA plaintiffs attorneys had incentives to shift litigation from federal
to state court). Moreover, this shift was a direct result of the PSLRA provision of
higher pleading standards, mandatory discovery stay, forward-looking statements,
and lead counsel requirements. See id. (discussing reasons for shift to state court);
see also Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 108 (2d Cir.
2001) (stating that "litigants were able to assert many of the same causes of action,
but avoid the heightened procedural requirements instituted in federal court");
Prager v. Knight/Trimark Group, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 229, 232 (D.N.J. 2000)
("PSLRA drove many would-be plaintiffs to file their claims in state court, based on
state law, in order to avoid the heightened pleading requirements of PSLRA."); 2
THOMAs

LEE

HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAw OF SECURITIEs REGULATION

§ 7.17[2]

(5th ed. 2005) (explaining that remedies at state law and federal law overlapped).
41. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7 7 p, 77v, 77z-1, 78-4, and
78bb (2006)).
42. See H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 15 (Conf. Rep.) (stating best mode to protect requirements of PSLRA was to "make Federal court the exclusive venue for
most securities fraud class action litigation involving nationally traded securities").
Specifically, Congress found that:
(1) the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 sought to prevent abuses in private securities fraud lawsuits;

(2) since enactment of that legislation, considerable evidence has been
presented to Congress that a number of securities class action lawsuits
have shifted from Federal to State courts;
(3) this shift has prevented that Act from fully achieving its objectives;
(4) State securities regulation is of continuing importance, together with
Federal regulation of securities, to protect investors and promote strong
financial markets; and
(5) in order to prevent certain State private securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the objectives of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, it is appropriate to enact
national standards for securities class action lawsuits involving nationally
traded securities, while preserving the appropriate enforcement powers
of State securities regulators and not changing the current treatment of
individual lawsuits.
Id. at 1-2. Contemporaneous reports heralded SLUSA as a victory for the high
technology industry. See Jeri Clausing, Bill to Increase Work Visas for Foreigners Gets
New Lease on Life, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1998, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
1998/10/14/business/bill-to-increase-work-visas-for-foreigners-gets-new-lease-onlife.html?scp=6&sq=%22securities%201itigation%20uniform%20standards%22&st
=cse (indicating that SLUSA was "intended to protect technology and other startup companies from lawsuits in state courts over stock price fluctuations"). But see
144 CONG. REc. S4786 (daily ed. May 13, 1998) (letter from Norman S. Johnson,
SEC Commissioner, to Sen. Alfonse M. D'Amato, Sen. Phil Gramm, and Sen.
Christopher J. Dodd (Mar. 24, 1998)) ("I share in the views of 27 [sic] of this
country's most respected securities and corporate law scholars who have urged you
and your colleagues not to support S. 1260 [SLUSA] or any other legislation that
would deny investors their right to sue for securities fraud under state law.").
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3
purchases or sales of covered securities.4 SLUSA defines a "covered class
action" as "a single lawsuit" or "group of lawsuits" in which "damages are
44
The statute further provides
sought on behalf of more than 50 persons."
that certain state law securities claims that were historically within the pur45
Thus, Congress's intent under
view of state courts are not preempted.

43. The requirements of SLUSA state that:
No covered class action based upon the statutory or common law of any
State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any State or Federal
court by any private party alleging(1) an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in connection with
the purchase or sale of a covered security; or
(2) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.
15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2006).
44. The full text of this definition reads:
The term "covered class action" means(i) any single lawsuit in which(I) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons or prospective class members, and questions of law or fact common to those persons
or members of the prospective class, without reference to issues of individualized reliance on an alleged misstatement or omission, predominate
over any questions affecting only individual persons or members; or
(II) one or more named parties seek to recover damages on a representative basis on behalf of themselves and other unnamed parties similarly
situated, and questions of law or fact common to those persons or members of the prospective class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual persons or members; or
(ii) any group of lawsuits filed in or pending in the same court and involving common questions of law or fact, in which(1) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons; and
(1l) the lawsuits are joined, consolidated, or otherwise proceed as a single action for any purpose.
15 U.S.C. § 77p(f) (2) (A).
45. See 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d) (2) (A) (exempting from SLUSA actions "based
upon the statutory or common law of the State in which the issuer is incorporated
(in the case of a corporation) or organized (in the case of any other entity) may be
maintained in a State or Federal court by a private party"). This exception involves
breach of fiduciary duty claims "involving buy-backs, reorganizations, and rights
offerings," and also "class actions involving management positions, recommendations, or communications in connection with: (1) transactions requiring shareholder approval; (2) tender or exchange offers; or (3) the exercise of dissenters'
or appraisal rights." See PERINO, supra note 38, at 11,035-4 (discussing SLUSA exceptions); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d) ("[A] covered class action that seeks to enforce a contractual agreement between an issuer and an indenture trustee may be
maintained in a State or Federal court by a party to the agreement or a successor
to such party."); 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f) (2) (D) (excepting derivative actions from definition of "covered class action"). Finally, States themselves are free to bring class
actions under the following exception:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, nothing in this section maybe construed to preclude a State or political subdivision thereof
or a State pension plan from bringing an action involving a covered security on its own behalf, or as a member of a class comprised solely of
other States, political subdivisions, or State pension plans that are named
plaintiffs, and that have authorized participation, in such action.
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SLUSA was to preempt only certain state law securities fraud claims when
plaintiffs sue as a class. 46

III.

THE PROBLEM OF

SLUSA

PREEMPTION

Despite clear congressional intent to preempt certain state law claims,
a "recurrent practical question under SLUSA" remains: should courts dismiss an entire complaint when it contains both SLUSA-preempted claims
and non-preempted claims, such as a complaint that includes a state law
claim for fraud and a state law breach of contract claim or a federal law
claim?4 7 The importance of this problem should not be understated given
the prevalence of mixed-claim complaints. 4 8 In order to avoid claim preclusion, pleading requirements effectively force a plaintiff to assert both
SLUSA-preempted claims as well as non-preempted claims in the same
complaint.49 Therefore, many securities fraud claims involve both types of
claims.5 0 Yet, despite a large number of mixed-claim complaints, circuit
and district courts remain divided on the question of whether SLUSA requires dismissal of the entire complaint. 5'
A.

Courts Dismissing Mixed-Complaints

The circuit and district courts that have addressed the mixed-complaint issue do not agree on the proper interpretation of SLUSA. 5 2 In

15 U.S.C. §77p(d).
46. See H.R. REP. No. 105-640, at 16 (1998) (explaining that removal provision
and subsequent requirement of dismissal of actions was to "prevent a State court
from inadvertently, improperly, or otherwise maintaining jurisdiction over an action that is preempted" by SLUSA).
47. See Perry & Sur, supra note 2, at 3 (calling this preemption question one of
recurrent practicality).

48. See id. (emphasizing high frequency of mixed-claim complaints).
49. See id. (stating that claim preclusion requires plaintiffs to plead multiple
and alternative theories of relief, and that "suits raising multiple theories of relief
based on the same set of factual allegations-some of which may be SLUSA-precluded while others are not-can be expected to be filed with some frequency"
(citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979); Herrmann v.
Cencom Cable Assoc., Inc., 999 F.2d 223, 226 (7th Cir. 1993))); see alsoJOSEPH W.
GLANNON, CivL PROCEDURE 543 (6th ed. 2008) (stating that res judicata bars claims
arising out same factual situation not brought or joined in single law suit).
50. See, e.g., In re Lord Abbett Mut. Fund Fee Litig., 553 F.3d 248, 249 (3d Cir.
2009) (alleging four federal law claims and four state law claims); In re Blackrock
Mut. Funds Fee Litig. No. 04 Civ. 164, 2006 WL 4683167, *3 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 29,

2006) (alleging both federal law violations and state law claims); In re Dreyfus Mut.
Funds Fee Litig., 428 F. Supp. 2d 342, 345-46 (W.D. Pa. 2005) (same); In re Franklin Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 388 F.Supp.2d 451, 471 (D.N.J. 2005) (same).
51. For examples of cases with mixed-claim complaints containing preempted
and non-preempted claims, see supra note 50. For a discussion of the circuit split
on this issue, see infra notes 53-71 and accompanying text.
52. For a discussion of the split among circuit and district courts, see infra
notes 53-71 and accompanying text.
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Behlen v. Mernill Lynch,53 the plaintiff filed several claims, both "covered
class action" claims and other state law class-wide claims. 5 4 Despite this
mixture of preempted and non-preempted claims, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded, without explanation or reasoning, that a court must dismiss, in
its entirety, any action that includes both preempted and non-preempted
claims.5 5
District courts in the Eleventh Circuit follow Behlen and, therefore,
similarly maintain that SLUSA's use of the word "action" requires dismissal
of the entire suit.5 6 For example, in Greaves v. McAuley, 57 the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia concluded that
SLUSA required remand of the entire action, not just the preempted
claims. 58 Greaves involved claims preempted by SLUSA as well as claims
expressly excepted from SLUSA's preemptive sweep. 59 Under SLUSA,
these excepted "actions" require a federal court to remand the action to
state court if the elements of the exception are met.6 0 Thus, the court was
faced with a paradoxical situation: on the one hand, the court must remand the "action" to state court because certain claims were excepted
from SLUSA's purview; on the other hand, SLUSA also mandates that a
court must dismiss the action if it is subject to SLUSA preemption. 61 Recognizing that remanding the action to state court conflicted with congressional intent to prevent state law securities fraud litigation, the court
53. 311 F.3d 1087 (11th Cir. 2002).
54. See id. at 1089 (providing that plaintiff filed claims based on "breach
of contract, breach of implied covenants and duties, breach of fiduciary duty,
unjust enrichment, suppression, misrepresentation, and negligence and/or
wantonness").
55. See id. at 1095 n.6 (concluding that district court had to dismiss all claims,
including some class-wide claims not presenting misrepresentation or individual
claims "[b]ecause Behlen's case was a 'covered class action' asserting state law
claims that fell within the scope of the SLUSA, the district court had no choice but
to dismiss the class-wide claims").
56. For a discussion of district court opinions within the Eleventh Circuit, see
infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
57. 264 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
58. See id. at 1085 (holding that entire complaint be remanded, both preempted and non-preempted claims, to state court).
59. See id. at 1083 (concluding that some of plaintiffs claims fulfilled requirement for SLUSA exception that claims brought under state law of home state of
securities issuer were not subject to SLUSA requirements).
60. The remand provision of SLUSA states:
In an action that has been removed from a State court pursuant to subsection (c) [requiring removal from state court to federal court if action
is covered by SLUSA], if the Federal court determines that the action may
be maintained in State court pursuant to this subsection, the Federal
court shall remand such action to such State court.
15 U.S.C. § 77p(d) (4) (2006).
61. See Greaves, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1085 (acknowledging argument that remand to state court runs contrary to congressional intent of SLUSA).
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concluded that Congress's use of "action" instead of "claim" required complete remand of the complaint.6 2
B.

Courts Allowing Claim-by-Claim Dismissal

On the other side of the circuit split stands the Second Circuit, where
in Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. (Dabit1) ,63 then-Judge
Sotomayor thoroughly examined the mixed-complaint preemption issue
and reasoned that SLUSA did not require dismissal of the entire complaint.64 In Dabit I, the plaintiffs filed both preempted claims and claims
that did not allege fraud. 65 Judge Sotomayor noted that though SLUSA
defines "covered class action" as a "single law suit," reading this language
as requiring dismissal of an entire complaint would effectively preempt
any state law claim brought together with a preempted claim.66 This evis62. See id. at 1085 (explaining that "[i]f Congress had intended to preempt
and preserve only specific types of claims, rather than entire lawsuits, Congress
could have easily done so" by using the word "claim" rather than "action" in the
statutory language); see also Superior Partners v. Chang, 471 F. Supp. 2d 750, 758
(S.D. Tex. 2007) (holding that court must dismiss entire action). The court in
Superior recognized the similar factual background to Greaves, and accordingly
adopted its reasoning almost verbatim. Superior Partners, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 758
(noting that the case was "nearly identical" to Greaves in that there was mixture of
both SLUSA preempted claims and state law claims that met exception to SLUSA).
Furthermore, the parties did not dispute that SLUSA applied to actions as a whole
and not specific claims, and thus, again despite the apparent frustration of congressional intent for exclusive federal court jurisdiction of securities fraud claims,
the court remanded the entire action to state court. See id. at 758-59 (concluding

that remand of the entire action was appropriate, including the SLUSA preempted
claims). Interestingly, the court here also relied upon the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey's opinion in In re Lord Abbett Mut. Funds Fee
Litig., 417 F. Supp. 2d 624 (D.N.J 2005), vacated, 553 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2009). See
Superior,471 F. Supp. 2d at 759 (citing to district court opinion from Lord Abbett as
persuasive authority for remanding entire action). In addition, other district
courts hold, without explanation and solely relying on the district court opinion in
Lord Abbett, that SLUSA required dismissal on the entire complaint, not just the
preempted claims. See Kutten v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 06-0937, 2007 WL 2485001
(E.D. Mo. Aug. 29, 2007) (holding that SLUSA requires dismissal of entire complaint if "at least one of the class action claims is preempted"), affd, 530 F.3d 669
(8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 598 (2008); Siepel v. Bank of Am., N.A., 239
F.R.D. 558, 569 n.11 (E.D. Mo 2006) (stating that "SLUSA preemption mandates
dismissal of the entire class action-not just individual claims"); see also Schnorr v.
Schubert, No. Civ-05-303-M, 2005 WL 2019878, at *7 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 18, 2005)
(citing Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney, 398 F.3d 295, 305 (3d Cir. 2005)) (dismissing entire complaint).
63. 395 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 2005) (Dabit1), rev'd on other grounds by Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006) (Dabit 11).
64. See Dabit 1, 395 F.3d at 47 (holding that SLUSA did not require dismissal
of entire complaint).
65. See id. at 27, 47 (reasoning that non-preempted claim did not allege fraud
that "coincided" with purchase or sale of security).
66. See id. at 47 (noting language that "might be read to suggest that where a
single complaint contains claims that include allegations triggering preemption
and other claims that do not, SLUSA prohibits maintenance of the entire action,"
but concluding that such language without more, should not require total dismis-
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ceration of state law claims, Judge Sotomayor concluded, was inconsistent
with the presumption against preemption rooted in respect for state police power.67
Notably, Judge Sotomayor's reasoning gained traction beyond the
Second Circuit.6 8 Expanding upon the holding in Dabit I, in Crimi v. Barnholt,6 9 the United States District Court for the Northern District of California employed common sense reasoning when it stated that "it does not
make sense that Congress would intend to bar legitimate claims simply
because they are brought under the umbrella of a lawsuit containing some
SLUSA-preempted state law claims."70 Thus, the circuit split juxtaposes
two main arguments, with the plain language of SLUSA at loggerheads
with federalism and common sense.7 1

IV.

THE THIRD CIRCUIT JOINS THE PREEMPTION PARTY IN

RoWINsKI

AND

LORD

ABBETT

Before 2005, the Third Circuit had yet to take a side in the circuit
split.7 2 Then, in Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney,73 it suggested in dicta
sal of complaint). But see Dabit I, 547 U.S. at 87 (claiming that SLUSA did not
really preempt state law, but just made class-action device unavailable to plaintiffs,
and thus presumption against preemption did not have as much force under
SLUSA); In re Lord Abbett Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 463 F. Supp. 2d 505, 513-14
(D.N.J. 2006) (reasoning that Dabit II undercut reasoning in Dabit I, and as such
held that SLUSA required complete dismissal of mixed-complaint), vacated, 553
F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2009).
67. See Dabit 1, 395 F.3d at 47 (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S.
304, 316 (1981)) (invoking plain statement rule in respect for state sovereignty).
Moreover, the court noted that the legislative history of SLUSA "indicate[d] no
intent to preempt categories of state action that do not represent 'federal flight'
litigation." See id. (describing congressional intent on SLUSA preemption); see also
Gray v. Seaboard Sec., Inc., 126 Fed. Appx. 14, 16 (2d Cir. 2005) (concluding that
SLUSA allows claim-by-claim dismissal).
68. For a discussion of district courts outside the Second Circuit, see infra
notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
69. No. C 08-02249, 2008 WL 4287566 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2008).
70. See id. at *5 (citing In re Am. Mut. Funds Fee Litig., No. CV-04-5593, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8276, at *21-22 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2007)) (concluding that purpose of SLUSA would not be served by dismissing entire complaint); see also
Falkowski v. Imation Corp., 309 F.3d 1123, 1128-32 (9th Cir. 2002) (assuming,
without explanation, that district court had jurisdiction to hear "garden variety
state law claims" that were not preempted by SLUSA).
71. For a discussion of courts citing to plain language of SLUSA, see supra
notes 56-62 and accompanying text. For a discussion of courts citing to federalism
and prudential reasoning, see supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
72. See Anderson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 521 F.3d
1278, 1288 n.6 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting split among circuits and district courts, but
declining to resolve issue as it was not squarely presented); Atkinson v. Morgan
Asset Mgmt., No. 08-2694, 2009 WL 324550, at *6 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 23, 2009)
(noting, post-Lord Abbett, split among circuit and district courts, but avoiding issue). For a discussion of the circuit split, see supra notes 53-71 and accompanying
text.

73. 398 F.3d 295 (3d Cir. 2005).
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that SLUSA required dismissal of the entire action. 74 The Rowinski court
found that SLUSA preempted the plaintiffs complaint, which alleged
breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and violations of state consumer
protection law, because the plaintiff incorporated allegations of fraud into
every count of the complaint.7 5 The court opined, however, that even if
the plaintiffs claims did not each sound in fraud, it would still have dismissed the plaintiffs entire complaint-both preempted and non-pre76
empted state law claims-pursuant to the plain language of SLUSA.
Four years later, in In re Lord Abbett Mutual Funds Fee Litigation,7 7 the
Third Circuit squarely addressed the issue of whether a court must dismiss
an entire complaint when it contains SLUSA preempted and non-preempted claims.7 8 Although general practice dictates that courts considering a motion to dismiss review each claim individually, the court in
Rowinski suggested that the language of SLUSA requires departure from
such individual claim review. 7 9 Despite this prior dicta, the Third Circuit
in Lord Abbett followed a deliberate interpretive path of text, legislative history, purpose, and precedent to ultimately conclude that SLUSA does not
disrupt the general practice of claim-by-claim dismissal and, in so doing,
held in favor of plaintiffs' rights under SLUSA. 8 0
A.

Factual and Procedural Background

Lord, Abbett & Co. LLC (Lord Abbett) is an investment company that
manages mutual funds. 8 ' The plaintiffs, a proposed class of mutual fund
shareholders managed by Lord Abbett, alleged that Lord Abbett charged
its investors excessive fees in order to pay Lord Abbett's brokers to market
more of its funds to other investors. 82 In response to this alleged misdeed,
74. See id. at 305 (questioning whether claim-by-claim dismissal is consistent
with SLUSA and reasoning that "[t]he statute does not preempt particular 'claims'
or 'counts' but rather preempts 'actions,' 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f) (1), suggesting that if
any claims alleged in a covered class action are preempted, the entire action must
be dismissed"); see also In re Franklin Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 478 F. Supp. 2d 677,
682 (D.N.J. 2007) (concluding that SLUSA mandates dismissal of mixed-complaint
in its entirety). But see In re Blackrock Mut. Funds Fee Litig., No. 04 Civ. 164, 2006
WL 4683167, at *13-15 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2006) (ignoring Rowinski dicta and allowing non-preempted claims to survive dismissal).
75. See Rowinski, 398 F.3d at 305 (concluding that court need not rule on issue
of mixed-complaint preemption because plaintiffs incorporated preempted claims
by reference into each claim in complaint).
76. See id. (suggesting that SLUSA requires dismissal of entire suit).
77. 553 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2009).
78. See id. (stating that question presented is whether SLUSA requires complete complaint dismissal or allows claim-by-claim dismissal).
79. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 220-21 (2007) (explaining that general
practice in courts is to dismiss claim-by-claim).
80. For a discussion of reasoning in Lord Abbett, see infra, notes 81-112 and
accompanying text.
81. See Lord Abbett, 553 F.3d at 249 (stating nature of defendant's company).

82. See id. (detailing alleged "misdeeds" of Lord Abbett). Because Lord Abbett's compensation was directly proportional to the amount of assets it managed,
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the plaintiffs brought a class action suit, claiming violations of the Invest83
After
ment Company Act of 1940 and alleging state law fraud claims.
both parties submitted full briefing on the mixed-complaint issue, the district court, relying, inter alia, on Rowinski, dismissed the plaintiffs'
84
The plaintiffs subsequently filed a
amended complaint with prejudice.
timely appeal to the Third Circuit, arguing that even if SLUSA preempted
their state law claims, the court should still have entertained the federal
85
claims and erred in dismissing the entire complaint.
B.

Lord Abbett: "Textbook" Statutory Interpretation

In a unanimous decision, the Third Circuit held in Lord Abbett that
SLUSA does not require a court to dismiss an entire complaint when it
includes a mixture of both preempted state law claims and non-preempted
federal law claims.8 6 The court concluded that the statutory language of
SLUSA, its legislative history, the purpose of SLUSA, and relevant case law
87
Thus, the court aligned itself with
did not support complete dismissal.
the Second Circuit in finding that Congress did not intend to require
88
wholesale dismissal of complaints with otherwise valid claims.
the more brokers sold Lord Abbett funds, the more fees Lord Abbett could reap.
See id. (stating Lord Abbett's alleged motivation to charge plaintiff extra fees was
"because its management fees were based on the amount of assets being managed-as the number of investors grew so did the assets-and so did the fees").
83. See id. (stating that plaintiffs' claims involved alleged violations of Sections
36(b) and 48(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and four state law counts
of fraud). Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 provides a cause
of action for breaches of fiduciary duty concerning compensation or payments. See
15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (2006) (stating elements for breach of fiduciary duty). Section
48(a) provides a cause of action for procurement of violations of any subchapter of
the Investment Company Act of 1940. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-47(a) (proving procurement violation).
84. See Lord Abbett, 553 F.3d at 249 (quoting district court's reasoning that
Rowinski "provided strong support, albeit in dicta, for the proposition that SLUSA
preempts entire class actions rather than individual claims") (internal quotations
omitted). The district court also relied upon the plain language of SLUSA that
Congress's use of claim or claims elsewhere in securities law and its non-use of
such language under SLUSA was persuasive authority that SLUSA required dismissal of the entire action. See id. at 252 (providing summary of textual analysis).
Moreover, the district court found that the Supreme Court's ruling in Dabit II undercut the Second Circuit's reasoning in Dabit I, despite the Court not directly
ruling on the mixed-complaint preemption issue. See id. at 253 (distinguishing
Dabit 1).
85. See id. (stating procedural posture).
86. See id. (holding SLUSA does not require dismissal of entire action).
87. See id. at 255 (summarizing reasoning for holding). For a complete discussion of each of the methods of reasoning provided by the Third Circuit, see
infra, notes 89-112 and accompanying text.
88. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's view on SLUSA preemption of
mixed-complaint suits, see supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
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Interpretation of the Plain Language of SLUSA

The court first looked to the plain language of SLUSA to decipher
Congress's intent vis-t-vis mixed-complaint preemption and concluded
that the plain language "does not clearly indicate whether Congress intended SLUSA to pre-empt entire actions that include an offending statelaw claim."89 Examining this plain language, the court explained that
SLUSA defined "no covered class action" as a "single lawsuit" or a "group
of lawsuits."9 0 Though this seemed to suggest that a court must dismiss a
mixed-complaint-indeed this was the dicta in Rowinski-the court countered by explaining that SLUSA's phrase "based upon the statutory or
common law of any State" modified the word "action."9 1 Thus, the court
concluded that SLUSA does not require dismissal of actions that are only
based "in part on state law," such as the complaint in the instant case, and
which assert both non-preempted federal claims and SLUSA-preempted
state claims.9 2
2.

Inquiry into History and Purpose of SLUSA

After finding that the plain language of SLUSA did not clearly indicate Congress's intent, the Third Circuit next looked to its legislative history and statutory purpose.9 3 The court concluded that the legislative
history was silent as to whether Congress intended complete dismissal of
SLUSA actions. 9 4 Importantly, however, the court found this silence persuasive. 95 Because nothing in the legislative history compelled dismissal of
the entire action, and because the dismissal of preempted claims with the
retention of non-preempted claims, would not frustrate the stated purpose
of SLUSA-to curb abusive litigation and ensure application of national
legal standards-the court concluded that the legislative history did not
89. See Lord Abbett, 553 F.3d at 255 (concluding that plain language did not
conclusively determine issue because it did not clearly indicate congressional intent). Before examining the plain language, the court described its mode of statutory interpretation. See id. ("[T]he role of the courts interpreting a statute is to
give effect to Congress's intent." (quoting Rosenberg v. EX Ventures, 274 F.3d 137,
141 (3d Cir. 2001))). The court explained that the first step in giving effect to
Congress's intent is to consider the plain language of the statute to determine
whether, within this language, Congress expressed its intent "with sufficient precision." See id. at 253 (quoting United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 257 (3d Cir.
2000)) (describing first step of statutory interpretation).
90. See id. at 253 (interpreting language of SLUSA preemption clause). For
the full statutory text of SLUSA, see supra notes 43-45.
91. See id. at 255 (discussing why Rowinski's dicta reached wrong conclusion).
92. See id. (concluding that plain language of SLUSA is unclear if it requires
dismissal of actions based only on state law).
93. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's reasoning with respect to the legislative history and purpose of SLUSA, see infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
94. See Lord Abbett, 553 F.3d at 253 (noting absence of legislative history discussing dismissal of mixed-complaints).
95. See id. (reasoning that because of congressional silence on issue at bar, its
holding was consistent with overall purposes of SLUSA).
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96
Any alternative holding, the
support dismissal of the entire complaint.
court reasoned, could penalize those plaintiffs who are unsure if SLUSA
preempts some of their claims and assert those tenuous claims along with
other, non-preempted claims. 97

3.

Effects of Relevant Precedent

Finally, the court justified its interpretation of SLUSA by considering
relevant precedent.9 8 First, the court considered the Second Circuit's decision in Dabit I, which held that SLUSA does not require dismissal of the
entire complaint.99 Although the Supreme Court reversed the Second
Circuit in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit (Dabit II) ,100

the Third Circuit explained that because the Supreme Court was not
squarely presented with the mixed-complaint preemption issue, the
Court's holding in Dabit I did not abrogate the Second Circuit's conclu10 1
sion that a court should retain non-preempted claims.
96. See id. at 254 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 15 (1998) (Conf. Rep.))
(stating congressional purposes of SLUSA); see also id. at 255 (explaining that it

"struggle[d] to see" how allowing non-preempted claims to survive motion to dismiss would run afoul of stated congressional motives for SLUSA).
97. See id. at 254 (countering arguments that SLUSA's intent was to dissuade

plaintiffs from all attempts to litigate in state courts). Because the "language of the

statute and the legislative history do not counsel that SLUSA is to have such a
punitive effect," the court found that it would be contrary to SLUSA's purposes to
dismiss the entire complaint. See id. (concluding that congressional intent lacking
for SLUSA to have punitive effect). But see Perry & Sur, supra note 2, at 9 (arguing
that Third Circuit's discussion of punitive effects of SLUSA reflected "independent
judgment" outside Congress's intent).
98. See Lord Abbett, 553 F.3d at 256 ("Our understanding of SLUSA's requirements with respect to dismissal is not inconsistent with relevant case law."). For a
discussion of the Third Circuit's reasoning from precedent, see infra notes 99-112
and accompanying text.
99. See Lord Abbett, 553 F.3d at 256 (considering whether the Supreme Court's
holding in Dabit II "implicitly rejected" Second's Circuit's interpretation of SLUSA
preemption in Dabit 1). In Lord Abbett, the district court had reasoned that "the
Supreme Court's holding in Dabit II'implicitly rejected the Second Circuit's view'
of the issue presented in this case." See id. (explaining district court's reasoning).
100. 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
101. See Lord Abbett, 553 F.3d at 256 (distinguishing Dabit I on grounds that
Supreme Court did not address SLUSA preemption issue that Lord Abbett and Dabit
I both involved). Specifically, Dabit H overruled the Second Circuit's interpretation of the purchase or sale requirement from SLUSA and found that a holder of a
security was still subject to SLUSA's requirements. See Dabit II, 547 U.S. at 88-89
(finding holder of securities distinction irrelevant for SLUSA preemption). Further distinguishing Dabit II, the Third Circuit explained that the same claims will
still be pre-empted by SLUSA, but any federal claims pled in the same complaint
will fall outside SLUSA's scope and, therefore, should not be dismissed. See Lord
Abbett, 553 U.S. at 256 (holding that federal claims need not be dismissed). In
support of this reading of Dabit II, the Third Circuit noted that the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York had relied upon a similar
reading of Dabit II and held that, on the mixed-complaint pre-emption issue, Dabit
I is still good law. See id. at 257 (citing LaSala v. Bank of Cyprus Pub. Co., 510 F.
Supp. 2d 246, 274-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (reporting that courts in Second Circuit still
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Distinguishing another Supreme Court case, Kircher v. Putnam Fund
Trust,10 2 the Third Circuit explained that Kircher's potentially contradictory language was not controlling.10 3 In Kircher, the Supreme Court
stated, in the context of remand appealability, that SLUSA allows a defendant to remove a preempted action from state to federal court for termination of the whole action. 10 4 Despite this language, the Third Circuit
distinguished Kircher because it did not "confront the issue at hand." 0 5
Accordingly, the language in Kircher relating to "action" and "proceedings"
had no bearing on the holding in Lord Abbett. 06
Finally, the Third Circuit turned to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)1 0 7 in Jones v. Bock to support its reasoning that the use of "action" in SLUSA does not prohibit
claim-by-claim dismissal. 108 The PLRA provides: "No action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions .

.

. until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted." 0 9 The Supreme Court held that
Congress's use of "no action" was "boilerplate," and without an express
congressional statement to the contrary, courts must follow the "general
practice" of claim-by-claim dismissal. 110 Analogizing the Court's reasonrely on Dabit I despite Supreme Court's overruling it on other grounds); see also
Gray v. Seaboard Sec., Inc., 126 Fed. Appx. 14, 16 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that
SLUSA only requires claim-by-claim dismissal).
102. 547 U.S. 633 (2006).
103. See Lord Abbett, 553 F.3d at 256 (stating that Kircher does not "compel us
to hold that SLUSA requires dismissal of an action in its entirety").
104. See id. at 256 n.10 ("'If the action is precluded, neither the District Court
nor the state court may entertain it, and the proper course is to dismiss' ....
'SLUSA avails a defendant of a federal forum in contemplation not of further litigation over the merits of a claim brought in state court, but of termination of the
proceedings altogether' (quoting Kircher,547 U.S. at 644, 644 n.12)) (second emphasis added).
105. See Lord Abbett, 553 F.3d at 256 (distinguishing reasoning of Supreme
Court on grounds that issue presented there was different from issue at bar).
106. See id. at 256 n.10 ("Given that the Supreme Court [in Kircher] did not
have to confront the issue at hand, we do not believe that the use of the words
'action' and 'proceedings' reflects a holding as to this issue."); see also Proctor v.
Vishay Intertech., Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009) (distinguishing Kircher
on grounds that district court did not have jurisdiction over SLUSA from outset,
but further noting that nothing in Kircher suggests or requires that courts must
dismiss removed case when district court did properly have jurisdiction).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006).
108. See Lord Abbett, 553 F.3d at 257 (analogizing Supreme Court's interpretation of "no action" in context of PLRA to facts of current case (citingJones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007))).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
110. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 220-21 (reasoning that Congress's use of phrase "no
action" does not indicate that it intended to require courts to dismiss entire action
where plaintiff fails to exhaust remedies on only some, but not all, of his or her
claims). The Supreme Court reasoned in Jones that the phrase "no action shall be
brought" is "boilerplate language," and that "as a general matter," without express

language to the contrary, if a "complaint contains both good and bad claims, the
court proceeds with the good and leaves the bad." See id. at 221 (explaining pre-
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ing in Jones to its interpretation of SLUSA, the Third Circuit explained
that the reasoning in Jones was equally applicable in Lord Abbett because of
SLUSA's similar phrase "no covered class action" and the lack of clear
congressional intent to change the "general practice" of claim-by-claim dismissal.11 1 Thus, the Third Circuit concluded that SLUSA did not require
complete dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint and remanded the case to
the district court for reconsideration of the plaintiffs' federal law
claims. 112

V.

BEYOND LORD ABBETT: THE SCOPE OF LORD ABBETT AND INSIGHTS
FOR FUTURE SLUSA PREEMPTION CASES

While the Lord Abbett opinion leaves certain SLUSA preemption issues
unsettled, it offers important insights for practitioners handling future
By its facts, Lord Abbett controls in Third Circuit
preemption cases.'1"
mixed-complaint cases where the non-preempted claims are federal, but
leaves open the question of whether its holding also applies when the
plaintiff alleges non-preempted state law claims, rather than federal law
claims." 4 This issue is especially important in the Third Circuit, as it is
home to Delaware and, therefore, potentially host to a significant amount
5
of corporate litigation under state law."
When litigating this novel issue, practitioners in the Third Circuit can
utilize the uncertainty in Lord Abbett's holding to argue that SLUSA does or
sumption of piecemeal dismissal of claims). Because of this "general" practice, the
Supreme Court reasoned that if Congress wanted to depart from this norm, then
the Court would have expected some express congressional intent to do so. See id.
(requiring plain statement from Congress to overcome presumption).
111. See Lord Abbett, 553 F.3d at 257 (analogizing Jones to instant case because
of similar "no action" language and Congress's lack of plain statement to overcome
presumption of piecemeal dismissal); accord Proctor, 584 F.3d at 1227 (citing to
Jones for reasoning that use of "action" does not foreclose claim-by-claim dismissal);
LaSala v. UBS, AG, 510 F.Supp.2d 213, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (providing that Jones
illustrates the "norms for interpreting statutory language concerning dismissal of a
complaint"); see also Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. (DabitI),
395 F.3d 25, 40 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that express congressional intent is needed
to interfere with state police power), rev'd on other grounds by Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit (Dabit Hl), 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
112. See Lord Abbett, 553 F.3d at 258 (remanding case to district court).
113. For a discussion of the unsettled issues from Lord Abbett, see infra notes
114-151 and accompanying text.
114. Compare Lord Abbett, 553 F.3d at 256 ("We hold simply that any valid federal claims pled in the same action-claims that, if brought independently, would
clearly fall outside of SLUSA's pre-emptive scope-need not also be dismissed."),
with id. at 255-56 ("We hold therefore that SLUSA does not mandate dismissal of
an action in its entirety where the action includes only some pre-empted claims.").
115. For a discussion of the exceptions to SLUSA, see supra note 45. These
exceptions are termed the "Delaware carve-out" in recognition of the fact that
most of these state law claims will be under Delaware law. See Malone v. Brincat,
722 A.2d 5, 13 (Del. 1998) (explaining origins of "Delaware carve-out").
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does not require complete dismissal of the suit. 16 To support dismissal of
the entire complaint, defense counsel should emphasize that Lord Abbett's
holding is narrow and only relates to a mixed complaint when the nonpreempted claims fall under federal law.' 1 7 On the other hand, plaintiffs'
attorneys can argue that the Third Circuit's reasoning in Lord Abbett did
not completely ignore non-preempted state law claims.1 1 8 In particular,
the Third Circuit stated in Lord Abbett that "failing to dismiss the entire
complaint [because some claims were preempted] would simply allow
class action federal claims, and state law claims that do not trigger the
SLUSA preemption, to proceed."' 19 In support of interpreting Lord Abbett's holding narrowly or broadly, practitioners on both sides can develop
arguments grounded in SLUSA's text, legislative history, and purpose, in
addition to raising prudential concerns such as abusive litigation and judicial economy. 120
A.

Textualist Arguments

In support of interpreting Lord Abbett's holding broadly-such that it
is improper to dismiss the entire complaint regardless of whether plaintiffs
base their non-preempted claims on state or federal law-plaintiffs' attorneys can cite SLUSA's plain language, which makes no distinction between
whether the non-preempted claim is state or federal.' 2 1 Indeed, the
Ninth Circuit, in Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc.,' 2 2 recently used similar reasoning, citing to Lord Abbett, when it addressed the exact issue of
non-preempted state law claims.' 2 3 The Ninth Circuit focused in particular on the word "maintained" in SLUSA's instruction that "no coveredclass action" can be "maintained" in state or federal court.124 It explained
116. See Lord Abbett, 553 F.3d at 256 (seeming to limit holding to only federal
claims that are not preempted by SLUSA).
117. See id. ("We hold simply that any valid federal claims pled in the same
action-claims that, if brought independently, would clearly fall outside of
SLUSA's pre-emptive scope-need not also be dismissed.").
118. See id. (omitting federal claim limitation, suggesting that all non-preempted claims are reserved).
119. See id. at 255 (emphasis added) (providing reasoning from legislative intent and purpose).
120. For a discussion of practitioners' arguments utilizing various statutory
interpretive methods, see infra notes 122-145 and accompanying text.
121. See Lord Abbett, 553 F.3d at 255 (examining plain language of SLUSA and
concluding that it did not require dismissal of non-preempted claims).
122. 584 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2009).
123. See id. at 1227 (concluding that plain meaning of SLUSA did not mandate dismissal of non-preempted state law claims). The underlying claims in Proctor, in addition to SLUSA preempted claims, were a state law derivative claim for
breach of fiduciary duty and a class action claim for a class of minority shareholders for "quasi appraisal" under Delaware law. See id. at 1221 (classifying claims in
complaint as either those which were preempted by SLUSA or those that were
decidedly not preempted).
124. See id. at 1227 (reasoning that "maintained" modifies meaning of statute
in that only those claims that are preempted may not go forward).
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that the use of "maintained" illustrated that courts should focus on the
"content of the action as it goes forward."1 2 5 Thus, a court must dismiss a
preempted SLUSA claim, but may retain a non-preempted claim, without
regard to whether the non-preempted claim is under state or federal
law.' 26
Despite this language in SLUSA, defense counsel is not without argument that courts should dismiss the entire complaint.12 7 Specifically, even
if the language of SLUSA does not distinguish between non-preempted
claims brought under federal or state law, defense counsel can directly
challenge the Third Circuit's reasoning in Lord Abbett by arguing that Congress intended dismissal of the entire complaint. 128 For example, some
commentators point to Congress's explicit definition of "covered class action" as "a single lawsuit." 129 This definition arguably overcomes the
Third Circuit's analogy to the Supreme Court's reasoning in Jones that,
without express congressional intent, courts will always keep the good
claims and dismiss the bad claims.1 30 In addition, several textualist arguments support dismissal of the entire complaint.1 31 For example, com125. See id. ("By using the word 'maintained' rather than 'filed,' the language
focuses on the content of the action as it goes forward, not as it began, and so does
not require that a federal court dismiss an entire action where only some claims
are precluded by SLUSA.").

126. See id. (holding that court could dismiss preempted claims, but reserve
non-preempted claims).
127. For a discussion of defense counsel's arguments, see infra notes 129-137
and accompanying text.
128. For a discussion of arguments that defendants can employ to undermine
Lord Abbett, see infra notes 129-137 and accompanying text.

129. See Perry & Sur, supra note 2, at 5 (arguing that statute's language is plain

and lawsuit is not synonymous with claims). But see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 87 (2006) (describing SLUSA's preclusive
sweep as "[i]t simply denies plaintiffs the right to use the class-action device to
vindicate certain claims") (emphasis added).
130. See Perry & Sur, supra note 2, at 5 ("The statutory definition of covered
class action makes it crystal clear that the unit of analysis for SLUSA purposes is
lawsuits, not claims.") (internal quotations omitted); see alsoJoan Steinman, Claims,
Civil Actions, Congress & the Court: Limiting the Reasoning of Cases Construing Poorly
Drawn Statutes, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1593, 1594 (2008) (finding that Congress's
definition in SLUSA evidences express purpose to change general dismissal practice). But see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) (defining class action as "[o]ne or more
members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all
members only if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable"). Thus, plaintiffs' attorneys could argue that Congress provided a definition for "covered class action" because "class action," as defined under SLUSA,
is not actually a "class action" as defined under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Jennifer O'Hare, Preemption Under the Securities Litigation Uniforn StandardsAct: If It Looks Like a SecuritiesFraud Claim and Acts Like a Securities Fraud Claim,
Is It a Securities Fraud Claim, 56 ALA. L. REv. 325, 340 n.87 (2004) (concluding that
SLUSA's definition of class action is much broader than Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23).

131. For a discussion of some additional textualist arguments that defense
counsel can make, see infra notes 132-137 and accompanying text.
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mentators explain that under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "there
is but one form of action-the civil action."1 3 2 This use of "action," well
known to Congress, defines "action" not as a single claim but rather as the
entire suit.' 3 3 Therefore, the use of "action" under SLUSA arguably refers

to the entire complaint.134
Further, defense counsel can argue that courts should interpret
SLUSA in light of the PSLRA, which contains such language as "the pendency of the action, the claims asserted therein, and the purported class
period."' 3 5 Thus, given the PSLRA's use of the words action and claim,
Congress is aware of the distinction between actions and claims.1 3 6 Con132. See Perry & Sur, supra note 2, at 5 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 2).
133. See id. ("[N]umerous courts of appeals have relied on Rule 2 and concluded that the cap on compensatory damages set forth in the Civil Rights Act of
1991 applies to entire suits-not to individual claims within those suits-because
the relevant statute limits the relief obtainable 'in an action."'). But see Steinman,
supra note 130, at 1594 (stating that, in context of diversity jurisdiction, federal
court practice is to only dismiss those claims lacking jurisdiction). The diversity
jurisdiction statute also uses the word "action" and states that "the district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy
. . . ." See 28 U.S.C. 1332(a) (2006) (defining requirements for diversity jurisdiction) (emphasis added). Thus, despite the use of "action" here, courts still dismiss
on a claim-by-claim basis. Cf Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 220-21 (2007) (reasoning that despite use of word action in statute, general practice is to dismiss claimby-claim).
134. See Steinman, supra note 130, at 1604-05 ("When persons knowledgeable
of federal civil procedure think of a civil action, we normally conceive of the collection of claims and defenses that plaintiffs, defendants, intervenors, third-party defendants, and the like, are permitted by the Rules to assert against one another
135. See Perry & Sur, supra note 2, at 6 (noting use of claims and actions
under PSLRA and lack of use of claims, but arguing that use of actions under
SLUSA must be noted as deliberate); see alsoJacob Scott, Codified Canons and the
Common Law ofInterpretation,98 CEO. L.J. 341, 365 (2010) (explaining use of "holistic" statutory interpretation as appropriate "where a phrase is used in other statutes
and has a settled meaning," such that "interpreters should extract the same meaning from that phrase in other contexts"). But see In re Lord Abbett Mut. Fund Fee
Litig., 553 F.3d 248, 249-50 (2009) (citing LaSala v. Bordier et Cie, 519 F.3d 121,
127-28 (3d Cir. 2008)) (concluding that Congress enacted SLUSA as companion
to PSLRA); William B. Snyder, Jr., Comment, The Securities Act of 1933 After SL USA:
FederalClass Actions Belong in Federal Court, 85 N.C. L. REv. 669, 696 (2007) (noting
that SLUSA and PSLRA are "inextricably intertwined"). Thus, it is difficult to understand how non-preempted claims not subject to the pleading requirements of
the PSLRA, should also be subject to dismissal under SLUSA. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77p(b) (1) (2006) (requiring only those claims sounding in fraud to be subject to
its requirements); id. § 77z-1(a)(1) (governing only claims alleging violations of
Rule lOb-5).
136. Cf WiuALsM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC PoLIcy 833-35 (3d ed. 2001) ("'[W] here Congress includes particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another . . . , it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.'"
(quoting Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993))).
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gress's use of only the word "action" in SLUSA suggests a congressional
37
intent to preempt entire lawsuits rather than individual claims.'
B.

Structural and Legislative Purpose Arguments

To ascertain congressional intent on the preemption issue, practitioners can employ unique arguments stemming from other SLUSA provisions.13 8 Defense counsel arguing in favor of entire complaint dismissal
can point to SLUSA's removal provision, which allows defendants to remove all actions that involve claims rooted in fraud to federal court and
illustrates that courts are not to "split a case into constituent claims and
send some of those claims piecemeal to federal court .... "139 Moreover,
Congress's decision to provide explicit exceptions to SLUSA illustrates
40
that its preemptive sweep is only limited by these specific exceptions.'
On the other hand, SLUSA's remand provision, when interpreted
similarly to the removal provision, arguably provides a significant counterbalance to these arguments.' 4 1 SLUSA requires remand of any action that
42
Due to this requirement, if
meets one of the statutory exceptions.1
then SLUSA directs courts to
suit,
the
entire
as
courts are to view an action
a mix of preempted and
containing
a
complaint
remand, in its entirety,
43
express intent to
SLUSA's
of
is
inapposite
result
This
excepted claims.1
44
Therefore,
claims.'
preempted
these
not allow states jurisdiction over
can arattorneys
plaintiffs'
requirement,
because of the express remand
interpret
should
courts
consistency,
gue that to retain internal statutory
45
SLUSA to allow claim-by-claim dismissal.
137. See Perry & Sur, supra note 2, at 6 (concluding that absence of word
"claim" but inclusion of "action" in SLUSA must be given its due).
138. For a discussion of structural arguments from SLUSA, see infra notes
139-140 and accompanying text.
139. See Perry & Sur, supranote 2, at 7 (arguing from structural point of view).
140. See id. at 7-8 (stating that exceptions to SLUSA preemption are evidence
that Congress knew how not to preempt state claims). Arguing, again from Dabit
I, that the "statute carefully exempts form its operation certain class actions," that
such carve-outs "both evinces congressional sensitivity to state prerogatives in this
field and makes it inappropriate for courts to create additional, implied exceptions." See id. (arguing that exceptions provide enough protection of state interests
as Congress thought necessary).
141. For a discussion of the remand provision, see infra notes 142-145 and
accompanying text.
142. See 15 U.S.C. 77p(d)(4) (2006) ("In an action that has been removed
from a State court pursuant to subsection (c), if the Federal court determines that
the action may be maintained in State court pursuant to this subsection, the Federal court shall remand such action to such State court.").
143. See Greaves v. McAuley, 264 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1085 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (remanding entire action, SLUSA preempted claims and all, to state court); see also
Superior Partners v. Chang, 471 F. Supp. 2d 750, 758 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (same).
144. See Greaves, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1085 (stating that such remands seemed
contrary to congressional intent).
145. Cf 2B NoRMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51:2 n.19, at 229 (7th ed. 2008) ("[T]wo statutes relating to
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PrudentialArguments

From a prudential viewpoint, defense counsel arguing that a court
must dismiss the entire complaint can articulate that allowing courts to
dismiss, piecemeal, these mixed-complaints goes against the congressional
purpose of SLUSA to prevent abusive litigation.' 4 6 Commentators argue,
and practitioners can take note, that such mixed-complaints have an in
terrorem effect on defendants because the addition of known preempted
claims to a complaint will have a "strength in numbers" effect on the defendant.1 4 7 Because of the perceived strength this lends to a complaint,
opposing counsel might settle unmeritorious claims-contrary to Congress's express reasoning for enacting SLUSA.1 4 8
Finally, plaintiffs' attorneys can take advantage of a judicial economy
argument.149 By allowing plaintiffs to include multiple claims in one suit,
SLUSA forecloses the possibility of plaintiffs filing multiple suits separating the claims.1 5 0 The filing of these suits, combined with the burdensome procedural hurdle that restrains courts' ability to join suits because
of factual similarities, arguably wastes time and money.' 5 '
the same general subject matter should be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to a consistent legislative policy . . . .").
146. See Perry & Sur, supra note 2, at 8 (arguing that piecemeal dismissal frustrates congressional intent).
147. See id. (arguing that adding claims not only puts up facade of strength,
but also provides "safety in numbers" that assists plaintiffs in overcoming motion to
dismiss).
148. See id. (stating that effect of piecemeal complaint dismissal runs counter
to congressional worry that that pre-SLUSA "nuisance filings of securities fraud
class actions-and the associated targeting of deep-pocket defendants, vexatious
discovery requests, and manipulation by class action lawyers-led issuers to pay out

extortionate settlements") (internal quotations omitted); cf Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557-58 (2007) (stating that problem of liberal pleading in
antitrust suits results in plaintiffs presenting meritless claims, creating in terrorem
effect). But see 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b)(1) (2006) (explaining that no action may be
maintained in state or federal court). Thus, this "strength in numbers" logic ignores the fact that by allowing this piecemeal dismissal, defendants could also be
confident that courts would dismiss those SLUSA preempted claims at the motionto-dismiss stage. For a discussion of Congress's intent in enacting SLUSA, see infra
notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
149. See Proctor v. Vishay Intertech., Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009)
(reasoning that legislative history is devoid of intent to preempt claims not barred
under SLUSA). "Nothing ... suggests that Congress intended to place roadblocks
in the way of federal claims or non-precluded state law claims." Id. (second emphasis
added).
150. See id. (providing additional prudential reasoning of judicial economy
and conservation of resources); see also Don Zupanec, In re Lord Abbett Mutual
Funds Fee Litigation, FED. LITIGATOR, Mar. 2009 (agreeing with holding of Lord
Abbett because alterative reading would seem nonsensical).

151. See FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) ("If actions before the court involve a common
question of law or fact, the court may: (1) join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the actions; or (3) issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay."); see also 15 U.S.C. §77p(f)(2)(A)(ii)
(2006) (defining "covered class action" under SLUSA to include groups of lawsuits
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CONCLUSION

Shareholders in this troubled economy are looking to hold financial
institutions accountable for the alleged misdeeds that caused our economic collapse. 152 Before the Third Circuit's ruling in Lord Abbett, plaintiffs in the Third Circuit had to forgo possibly legitimate claims under
state law for fear that one misstatement in their complaint could eviscerate
all possible redress.15 3 Now, following the Third Circuit's decision in Lord
Abbett, plaintiffs are no longer required to make this choice, but are allowed full access to the available laws. 154 Despite Congress's known intent
to preempt certain state law class actions, Lord Abbett illustrates an interpretation of congressional silence and statutory ambiguity that, in practice,
preserves the federalism values that are a foundation of American democracy.15 5 These federalism values encompass claims, such as breach of contract, which have been recognized within the state police power since
America's founding.' 5 6 Indeed, the federal government possesses the
power to regulate securities, but courts must keep our nation's founding
7
principles in mind when construing such regulations.15 Federal interests
need not trump the legitimate interests of states or of the litigants who
"filed in or pending in the same court and involving common questions of law or
fact").
152. For a discussion of the increase in securities litigation, see supra notes 12.
153. See, e.g., Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney, 398 F.3d 295, 305 (3d Cir.
2005) (dismissing plaintiffs complaint because they incorporated allegations of
fraud into every claim).
154. See In re Lord Abbett Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 553 F.3d 248, 249 (3d Cir.
2009) (holding that courts need not dismiss plaintiffs non-preempted claims).
155. See Painter, supra note 9, at 89-94 (arguing that Congress should have
tailored SLUSA with more respect for state police power); cf O'Hare, supra note
130, at 343-44 (arguing that courts should read SLUSA's removal provision narrowly in respect for federalism). "Due regard for the rightful independence of
state governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that they [federal
courts] scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the
statute has defined." Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934).
156. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (stating
that contract claims are traditionally within purview of state law); James G. Kreissman, Note, Administrative Preemption in Consumer Banking, 73 VA. L. REV. 911, 944
(1987) (concluding that both contract and property law were historically state police powers).
157. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (explaining
that there exists an "assumption that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress"). Despite Dabit If's proclamation that the presumption
against preemption is not as strong under SLUSA, due to Congress's known intent
to preempt certain state securities law claims, such a diminishment of this presumption has less force with no intent from Congress to preempt other claims normally
reserved to states. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547
U.S. 71, 87 (2006) (stating that presumption against preemption not as strong
because Congress did not act "cavalierly" when enacting SLUSA).
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avail themselves of state laws; both federal interests and state interests can
coexist-neither losing any of its applicability or punch.1 58
Ethan H. Townsend

158. Cf In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 B.R. 308, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(stating that both 1933 Act and 1934 Exchange Act were "drafted to protect, rather
than to preempt, the state blue sky laws"); Ribstein, supra note 9, at 167-68 (arguing for changes to SLUSA that would allow states more control over securities regulation and not only preserve federalism, but not unduly constrict SLUSA).
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